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This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one count of Attempted Child
Kidnapping, a first degree lelom. in \k.iaiion ui i lai i
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* ii^i;-! District, in and for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon
this Court pursuant t<> i Uth ( ode Ann * :• J a o t J H i <-*</_:». see .\uuenu..
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ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue: Whether the trial court erred by ruling the Male presenteu sui iiciem
."* >•.!•'' ei
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.,,1 ^ i.- ;iuenipted child kidnapping under

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003) and § 76-4-Ml iSupp. 2005V
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favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124,1115, 63 P.3d 94.
It "will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." Id (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's
decision this Court still has the right to review the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the verdict. The fabric of evidence
against the defendant must cover the gap between the
presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In
fulfillment of its duty to review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing court will stretch
the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does not
mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a
remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict.
Id (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-45).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant David Carl Reed (Reed) preserved his argument that the trial court erred
in ruling the State presented sufficient evidence to support a first degree felony
conviction for attempted child kidnapping at R. 226:94-98 (motion to dismiss entered at
close of State's case) (Addendum B); see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,fl 1,^14, 10 P.3d
346 ("As a general rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the
evidence, a defendant must request that the court do so.").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions are relevant to the issue on appeal. Their text is
provided in full in Addendum C.
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Utah Code Ann... § 76-2-103(1) (2003) - Culpable Mental. State Definitions;

• "• Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1 (2003) - Child Kidnapping.
STATEMENT OF CASE
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a first degree felony; in \ iolation of I Uah Code Ann, §§ 76-5-301.! m\d 76-4-1 (::
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he was not guilty of attempted ehild kidnapping. R. 226:1 (>. He explained that he "did
not open the car door. I le did iu»i leh | A.^liL) l\>ik^ (i\>ikv. ., m me demanding way or
air.
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kidnap her, not to [seize] or confine or detain or transport her."' h i at 17.
At the close of the State's case, Reed "move[dJ the Court to uiMinss the case
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at 94. He raised two arguments in support of his motion. Id. First, Reed argued the
inconsistencies in Poike's statements established insufficiency olc\ idence. Id. at ^4-^x

taking the testimony of Ms. Poike in the light more favorable to the State, that that
statement was made and the car door was opened, that I do not believe that that's a
si--i.il' Hi1

u !>mpn4M'," '

;

.
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denied Reed's motion, holding Poike's credibility was a question for the jury, and
Poike's testimony that Reed opened the car door and demanded, that she "get in"
3

established "a substantial step towards the possibility of detaining her against her will or
without any authority." Id at 96-98.
The trial court instructed the jury as to the elements of attempted child kidnapping
and attempted lewdness involving a child, the lesser-included offense. R. 157-58; 160.
The trial court also instructed the jury as to the statutory definitions of intentionally and
knowingly. R. 161. In Reed's closing argument, he argued Poike's testimony was not
credible. R. 227:48-55. Regardless, her testimony that he "opened the car door and told
her to get it" did not "constitute a substantial step towards accomplishing a child
kidnapping." Id at 56-57. Following deliberation, the jury found Reed guilty of
attempted child kidnapping. R. 179; 227:72. On July 26. 2005, the trial court sentenced
Reed to an indeterminate term of 3 years to life and granted credit for time served. R.
203-08. On August 2, 2005, Reed filed his notice of appeal. R. 209-10. On August 24,
2005, the Utah Supreme Court transferred Reed's case to this Court. R. 220.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

Evidence Presented By the State:
On August 12, 2004, twelve-year-old Poike was walking her dog west along the

north sidewalk of 500 South. R. 226:22-23; State's Exhibit 7. She was walking to
Franklin Elementary School. Id, at 23. In her testimony, Poike described her dog as a
"pretty big" "golden retriever-mutt mix." Id. at 44, 48. She also described her encounter
with Reed. Id. at 22-30. When she was walking past the Post Street Tot Lot Park,
located on the northeast corner of Post Street and 500 South, she saw a four-door car
parked across the street facing the same direction she was. Id. at 24-25, 33, 36; State's
4

Lxii^;
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Poike walked past the lot 1 oi Park, across Post Street, and "a bit" farther. Id at
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as she testified. Id at 38. She did not want to get any closer to the car and she started
thinking about crossing 500 South or getting away. Id. at 37. Then, the man "reach[ed]
0\ ei u- ,.ic : .i-j^Cch. opened liu ; i_... . ..v., door, and "wnijU. "ii,im
car/" in "a demanding wax
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500 South and into the alley just east of the house at 965 West 500 South. Id. at 28;
Stale s i^xnin.
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not "know if it was [the same] car," but she thought it iniglii IK\ - - **' e ran to the hons. it
965 West 500 South, which was her friend's house. Id. at 29-30. 41: State's Exhibit 7.
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Lloyd Ferguson, who lived directly across the street to the south of the Tot Lot
Park at v.), w ^

J; -. .Nuuin. witnessed l\nkc s encounter with the man from his front
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porch. Id at 76; State's Exhibit 7. Ferguson said he saw Poike walking west on 500
South "with her dog." R. 226:76, 79. A man in a car headed east stopped "right there in
front of [his] house" and spoke to Poike. Id at 76-77, 79. Poike looked at the man,
shook her head, and "kept on walking." Id at 77, 79-80. The man in the car "flipped" a
U-turn so he was driving west on the same side of the street as Poike, drove passed Poike
and the stop-ahead sign, and stopped at the stop sign at the corner of 1000 West and 500
South. IcL at 77, 81-82; State's Exhibit 7. The man "kept looking back," possibly "in the
rear view mirror." R. 226:82. Ferguson could not hear what was going on, but he never
saw the man turn his head or body around or open the car door. Id at 83-84. Poike
reached the stop-ahead sign "directly across the street from the house" at 965 West 500
South and, "the next thing you know, she runs across the street" right "where the
driveway is." Id. at 77, 83; State's Exhibit 7. The man in the car then "turned the
corner" and "almost wiped out another car when he was turning the corner to take off."
R. 226:77.
Deanna Talbott, the grandmother of Poike's friend who lived at 965 West 500
South, testified Poike came "pounding on the door" of her granddaughter's house,
opened the door, and entered before she even "got off the couch." Id at 48, 53. Poike
was "hysterical." Id at 48, 53-54. She was crying and shaking and her voice was
strained. Id. at 49. She told Talbott she had been walking by the Tot Lot Park with her
dog when:
[a] man pulled over and said, 'Get in the car.' She kept
walking, and she was going across the street from my
granddaughter's house, and he opened the door, the back door
6

on the passenger side, and told her to get in, and she didn't.
She run across the street, and she was going to go down the
alley that goes down alongside my granddaughter's house.
And she saw him go by the other end of the block, so she
come running—that's when she came in the house.
IdL at 49-50; see kL at 54-55.
Officer Joseph Schirle, who responded to Talbott's call, arrived about ten minutes
later. Id. at 31, 56, 86. He said Poike described the man "as having black hair" in "a
Mohawk style." Id at 41. He drove her to look at a suspect and she identified Reed as
the man in the car. Id at 31-32, 86-87. Officer Catherine Schoney interviewed Poike on
August 13 and August 16. Id, at 58. She said Poike again described the man as having
black hair and a Mohawk. Id at 42, 68.
Officer Schoney also interviewed Reed on August 12. Id at 59. At the time, Reed
had blond, greased-back hair. Id at 60, 70; State's Exhibits 2, 3; Defendant's Exhibit 4b. Initially, Reed said he did not "know anything about" the case. R. 226:62. After more
questioning, Reed said he "pulled over," but "did not talk to [Poike]." Id at 63. He
"thought of exposing [him]self," put his hand "down at [his] zipper," and "yelled, 'Hey,'"
to "get her attention." Id at 63-64, 68. He then "stopped" and "circled around the block
to do it again." Id. He stopped the car "a block" ahead of her. Id. Then Poike "took off'
so he "took off and "just left." Id at 63-64, 66. When Officer Schoney asked Reed
whether he opened the car door and told Poike to get in, he said, "'No, no, I did not. I
swear to God I did not open the car door and tell her to get in.'" Id at 64. Thereafter, he
repeatedly denied opening the car door or telling Poike to get in and offered to take a
polygraph test to prove it. Id. at 65, 69. When asked why Poike would say he opened the
7

door and told her to get it, Reed said, '"Maybe she's scared. Maybe she wants me
arrested for sure, but, no."' Id at 71-72.
Detectives Cody Lougy and David Harris impounded and searched the car, which
belonged to Reed's girlfriend, Rebecca Fehse. Id at 91; R. 227:30-31. The State called
Detective Harris as a rebuttal witness after the defense rested. R. 227:29. Detective
Harris testified that during the impound search he found a knife and a canister of mace or
pepper spray. Id at 32. He also found a baseball bat "[o]n the floor of the car behind the
front seat." Id
B.

Evidence Presented By the Defense:
Reed took the stand and admitted he had been convicted of providing false

information to a police officer in 1999. R. 226:101. He then testified that on the
afternoon of August 12, 2004, he had the blond, greased-back hairstyle depicted in
State's Exhibits 2 and 3 and Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Id. at 100-01. That day, he was
job-hunting in Fehse's car and was "in a fairly good mood." Id. at 101, 119, 122. He did
not drive Fehse's car often, but he kept some clothes in the trunk. Id at 125. Fehse kept
a baseball bat and a can of mace in the car for protection. Id at 123. He did not recall
any towels in the backseat. Id. at 124.
While job-hunting, Reed "got kind of lost" in the vicinity of 900 West and 500
South. Id at 101. As he was driving east on 500 South, he saw Poike walking west with
her dog and "pulled off the side of the road." Id. at 102-03. Looking for a thrill or a
rush, he decided to expose himself to her. Id at 119. He shifted so his "belt line was
above the door," put his "hand on [his] belt buckle and the tip of [his] zipper between
8

[his] fingers," and "said, 'Hey.'" Id. at 104-05. He did not pull the zipper down. Id.
Poike "glanced at" him briefly and kept walking. IdL at 105. Because Poike ignored him,
Reed did not get the thrill or rush he was seeking. Id. at 119.
Reed "flipped a U-turn" and "drove west down the street... a block and a half, to
the stop sign" at 1000 West and 500 South. Id at 105; State's Exhibit 7. He stopped at
the stop sign for ten to fifteen seconds to check "the street signs trying to find out exactly
where [he] was." R. 226:106. He also "glanced in [his] mirror a couple of times just to
see if there was any traffic behind [him]." Id He thought about trying to expose himself
to Poike again, but he "realized it was a bad idea" and decided not to. Id at 106-07.
While looking in his rearview mirror, he saw Poike, who was "about half to three
quarters" up the block, "run across the street." Id at 107. Reed denied opening a car
door or ordering Poike to "Get in" or "Get in the car." Id at 107-08.
On cross-examination, Reed admitted his "forthrightness" during his interview
with Detective Schoney "was pretty gradual." Id at 109. During the interview, he
initially denied knowing anything about the encounter, but then gradually admitted he
saw Poike, pulled over, and attempted to expose himself to her. Id at 109-10. He also
admitted he circled the block to try to expose himself to her again. Id at 110-13, 116. At
the time he testified, Reed did not remember going around the block. Id at 111-13, 11618. He said he may have told Detective Schoney he circled the block because he "was
upset and was being drilled with questions." Id. at 116-18. During his interview with
Detective Schoney, Reed consistently denied opening the car door and telling Poike to
get in the car. Id at 112, 126. He knew telling a child to get in his car "would not be

9

looked at as anywhere the same kind of thing as a simple flashing." Id. at 114. He told
Detective Schoney that he felt stress about losing his job and that stress "was enough" to
make him "go a little bit psycho." IcL at 120-21, 125. Occasionally, he felt "so stressed
out and rejected" that he thought about "hurting somebody." Id. at 121.
Fehse testified she was Reed's fiance and she and Reed had one son together. R.
227:22. On August 12, 2004, she owned the car depicted in State's Exhibit 4-a. Id at 23.
She kept shoes and towels in the car. Id. She also left a baseball bat under the driver's
seat, and a knife and some pepper spray in the glove box as weapons. Id. at 24. She
usually kept the bat in the trunk, but moved it under the seat in August or September after
two incidents where she was threatened in her car. IdL On cross-examination, Fehse said
she loved Reed enough to overlook the charged incident. Id. at 25.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court will reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when it concludes as a
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. It will view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict and reverse if the evidence is so
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. Here, the marshaled evidence
was insufficient to prove the substantial step element of attempted child kidnapping.
To prove Reed engaged in conduct constituting a substantial step toward the
commission of child kidnapping, the State had to show his conduct strongly corroborated
either his intent to commit child kidnapping or that he acted with an awareness that his
conduct was reasonably certain to result in child kidnapping. The marshaled evidence,
10

however, was so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial step toward
the commission of child kidnapping. It is unreasonable to conclude that by opening the
car door and saying "Get in," Reed intended to induce or acted knowing his conduct
might reasonably result in inducing a 12-year-old girl to abandon her plans and her large
dog and run half a city block past six neighbors' houses to get into a stranger's car.
Rather, as we know from his opening statement and from his testimony, the evidence
suggests Reed's intent was not to commit child kidnapping, but to get a rush or a thrill by
frightening Poike into running away.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT REED
WAS GUILTY OF ATTEMPTED CHILD KIDNAPPING
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when" it concludes
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v.
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,11 10, 2 P.3d 954 (citations omitted). It will "view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," and "will reverse only if the
evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" Id (citations
omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high/'
however, "it is not impossible." Id. (citations omitted). This Court "will not make
speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. (citations omitted). "Every element of
the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (citation omitted). In
11

other words, "[t]o affirm the jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has
introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." IdL (citation
omitted); see also Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at 1118; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368,1117,
993 P.2d 232.
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "'must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Boyd, 2001 UT
30,1113, 25 P.3d 985 (citations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the appellant to
present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in
original). "After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the
challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id
When reviewing the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier
of fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at H16. "'"It is the exclusive function of the jury to weigh
the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.'"" Id. (emphases and
citations omitted); see State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) ("When the
evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive judge of
both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular evidence."). Thus,
"[s]o long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which
findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [this Court's]
inquiry stops." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at HI6; see State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah
12

1991) (noting mere existence of conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal). Instead,
this Court will simply "'assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the
verdict."' Boyd, 2001 UT 30 at U16 (citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT
App 309,1130, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility,
but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the
verdict'" (citation omitted)).
In this case, Reed raised his motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence at
the close of the State's case-in-chief. R. 226:94. Thus, this Court should consider only
the evidence raised by the State in its case-in-chief when deciding whether there was
sufficient evidence to support Reed's conviction. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT
22,1J40, 70 P.3d 111 ("'A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at the
conclusion of the State's case in chief requires the trial court to determine whether the
defendant must proceed with the introduction of evidence in his defense.'" (citations
omitted); State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 UT App 289,1J9, 988 P.2d 949 (limiting review of
sufficiency of evidence in "appeal focuse[d] on the denial of the motion to dismiss at the
close of the State's case-in-chief. . . to the evidence adduced by the prosecution in its
case-in-chief," and holding "evidence presented by the defendant. . . [is] not relevant to
our inquiry"); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 573-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding prima
facie case based on facts established at close of State's case-in-chief). Accordingly, the
marshaled evidence is as follows:
1. On August 12, 2004, twelve-year-old Poike was walking her dog west along
the north sidewalk of 500 South. R. 226:22-23; State's Exhibit 7. She was walking to
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Franklin Elementary School. Id at 23. Lloyd Ferguson, who lived directly across the
street to the south of the Tot Lot Park at 937 West 500 South, saw Poike walking west on
500 South "with her dog." Id at 76, 79; State's Exhibit 7.
2. Poike's dog was a "pretty big" "golden retriever-mutt mix." R. 226:44, 48.
3. When Poike was walking past the Tot Lot Park, located on the northeast corner
of Post Street and 500 South, she saw a four-door car parked across the street facing the
same direction she was. Id. at 24-25, 33, 36; State's Exhibit 7. There was one person in
the car and he was sitting in the driver's seat. R. 226:25, 27. The passenger-side window
was the only window rolled down. Id. at 34. The man "yelled out, 4 Hey,'" "lift[ed]
himself up," and started "playing with" the zipper on his pants. Id, at 25, 33-34. When
Poike saw this, she "got scared," "looked away," and "kept walking." Id. at 25-26, 35.
4. Ferguson saw a man in a car headed east stop "right there in front of [his]
house" and speak to Poike. Id at 76-77, 79. Ferguson said Poike looked at the man,
shook her head, and "kept on walking." Id at 77, 79-80.
5. Poike said she walked past the Tot Lot Park, across Post Street, and "a bit"
farther. Id at 36; State's Exhibit 7. The man drove past her on the same side of the street
as she was on and stopped at "the next comer," which was the corner of 1000 West and
500 South. R. 226:26, 36; State's Exhibit 7. When the car stopped, it was "[n]ot that
close" to her. R. 226:27. It was about as far from her as the back of the courtroom was
as she testified. Id. at 38.
6. Ferguson said the man in the car "flipped" a U-turn so he was driving west on
the same side of the street as Poike, drove passed Poike and the stop-ahead sign, and
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stopped at the stop sign at the corner of 1000 West and 500 South. Id, at 77, 81-82; see
State's Exhibit 7.
7. Poike said she did not want to get any closer to the car and she started thinking
about crossing 500 South or getting away. R. 226:37. Then, the man "reach[ed] over to
the backseat," opened the "right-back door," and "yelled, 'Get in'" or '"Get in the car,'"
in "a demanding way." Id at 26-28, 39-40. Poike "felt scared" and "ran across" 500
South and into the alley just east of the house at 965 West 500 South. Id. at 28; State's
Exhibit 7. There, she "saw a car at the end of the alley." R. 226:29, 41. She did not
"know if it was [the same] car," but she thought it might be, so she ran to the house at
965 West 500 South, which was her friend's house. Id at 29-30, 41; State's Exhibit 7.
8. Ferguson said the man "kept looking back," possibly "in the rear view mirror."
R. 226:82. Ferguson could not hear what was going on, but he never saw the man turn
his head or body around or open the car door. Id at 83-84. Poike reached the stop-ahead
sign "directly across the street from the house" at 965 West 500 South and, "the next
thing you know, she runs across the street" right "where the driveway is." Id. at 77, 83;
State's Exhibit 7. The man in the car then "turned the corner" and "almost wiped out
another car when he was turning the corner to take off." R. 226:77.
9. Poike said Talbott "opened the door" and she "stay[ed] outside as [Talbott]
called the police." Id at 30.
10. Talbott said Poike pounded at the door, opened the door, and entered before
she even "got off the couch." Id at 48, 53. Poike was "hysterical." Id at 48, 53-54. She
was crying and shaking and her voice sounded strained. Id at 49. Poike said she had
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been walking by the Tot Lot Park with her dog when:
[a] man pulled over and said, 'Get in the car.' She kept
walking, and she was going across the street from my
granddaughter's house, and he opened the door, the back door
on the passenger side, and told her to get in, and she didn't.
She run across the street, and she was going to go down the
alley that goes down alongside my granddaughter's house.
And she saw him go by the other end of the block, so she
come running—that's when she came in the house.
Id at 49-50; see kL at 54-55.
11. Officers Schirle and Schoney said Poike described the man "as having black
hair" in "a Mohawk style." Id. at 41, 42, 68. Officer Schirle drove Poike to look at a
suspect and she identified Reed as the man in the car. Id. at 31-32, 86-87.
12. Officer Schoney said Reed had blond, greased-back hair as depicted in State's
Exhibits 2 and 3, and Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Id. at 60, 70; State's Exhibits 2, 3;
Defendant's Exhibit 4-b.
13. Officer Schoney interviewed Reed on August 12 and said Reed initially
claimed he did not "know anything about" the case. R. 226:62. After more questioning,
Reed said he "pulled over," but "did not talk to [Poike]." Id at 63. He "thought of
exposing [himjself," put his hand "down at [his] zipper," and "yelled, 'Hey,'" to "get her
attention." Id. at 63-64, 68. He then "stopped" and "circled around the block to do it
again." Id. He stopped the car "a block" ahead of her. IdL Then Poike "took off' so he
"took off and "just left." Id at 63-64, 66.
14. Officer Schoney said that when she asked Reed whether he opened the car
door and told Poike to get in, he said, "'No, no, I did not. I swear to God I did not open
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the car door and tell her to get in.'" Id, at 64. Thereafter, he repeatedly denied opening
the car door or telling Poike to get in and offered to take a polygraph test to prove it. Id,
at 65, 69. Officer Schoney said that when she asked Reed why Poike would say he
opened the door and told her to get in, Reed said, "'Maybe she's scared. Maybe she
wants me arrested for sure, but, no.'" Id, at 71-72.
15. Detective Cody Lougy impounded and searched the car, which belonged to
Reed's girlfriend, Rebecca Fehse. Id, at 91.
This evidence is insufficient to establish attempted child kidnapping.
An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor
intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and by
any means and in any manner, seizes, confines, detains, or
transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent of
the victim's parent or guardian, or the consent of a person
acting in loco parentis.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1) (2003).
(1) For purposes of this part, a person is guilty of an attempt
to commit a crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the crime; and
(b)(i) intends to commit the crime; or
(b)(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of
the crime, he acts with an awareness that his conduct is
reasonably certain to cause that result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial
step if it strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as
defined in Subsection (l)(b).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (Supp. 2005).
"In order for conduct to constitute a substantial step, there must be more than mere
preparation." State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Utah 1991). Rather, conduct
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constitutes a substantial step only "if it strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as
defined in Subsection (l)(b)" of the attempt statute. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(2). For
example, in Johnson, the evidence showed the defendant "purchased counterfeit crank
from undercover officers," but did not show "what she did or attempted to do with it."
Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1157. Since there was no evidence that she actually "attempted to
administer the substance" to her husband, the evidence did not establish the substantial
step needed to support a conviction for attempted first degree murder of her husband. Id.
Alternatively, in State v. O'Brien, 2003 UT App 419, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 264,
the defendant was illegally armed and driving a stolen vehicle, he led the officer on a
high-speed chase, a shot was fired from inside the vehicle he was driving, he emerged
from the vehicle holding a handgun and ran from the officer on foot, he sang a song about
killing cops with handguns when he was apprehended, and the investigation revealed a
bullet hit the officer's windshield at throat level. O'Brien, 2003 Utah App. LEXIS 264 at
*3-*4. This Court held these facts established the substantial step needed to support a
conviction for attempted aggravated murder of the officer. Id. at *3.
Similarly, in West Valley City v. Decker, 2000 UT App 97, 2000 Utah App.
LEXIS 221, the defendant "removed some photographs from the City's file and hid them
between two telephone books." Decker, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 221 at *1. The
defendant "later picked up the telephone books and left the building, unaware that City
employees had retrieved the photographs." Id. This Court held these facts established
the substantial step needed to support a conviction for attempted theft of the photographs.
Id at * l-*2; see Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 220 (Utah 1993) (holding evidence that
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defendant set mattress ablaze, firefighter saw nothing on mattress to prohibit spread of
flames, and arson investigator said mattress fire could destroy building, established
substantial step to support use of attempted aggravated arson as aggravating
circumstance); State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1989) (holding defendant's
entry into home with sawed-off shotguns established substantial step needed for attempt
element of aggravated robbery); State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 593-94 (Utah 1988)
(holding evidence that defendant accosted victim with knife and club and demanded to
know where she kept her silver and gold established substantial step needed for attempt
element of aggravated robbery); State v. Gutierrez, 714 P.2d 295, 295-96 (Utah 1986)
(holding evidence that defendant had his head under hood of truck he did not own,
walked away when confronted, returned with drawn knife, demanded that victim hand
over keys, ordered victim to lie on ground, and "slashed" at victim when he refused,
established substantial step needed for attempt element of aggravated robbery); State v.
Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 n. 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (noting evidence that defendant
aimed shotgun for five to seven seconds before firing at victim established substantial
step needed for attempted criminal homicide).
In this case, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Reed "engage[d] in conduct
constituting a substantial step toward commission o f child kidnapping, the State had to
show his conduct "strongly corroborate]^]" either his intent to commit child kidnapping
or that he acted "with an awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain" to result in
child kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b), (2). A defendant acts with intent to
commit the crime when it is his "conscious objective or desire" to commit the crime.
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (2003). A defendant acts knowingly, as defined by the
attempt statute, "when causing a particular result is an element of the crime" and "he acts
with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause that result." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-101(l)(b)(ii); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). Thus, the State had to
prove Reed's conduct "strongly corroborate[d]" either his "conscious objective or desire"
to seize, confine, detain, or transport Poike without authority of law or the consent of her
parents, or that he acted "with an awareness that his conduct was reasonably certain" to
result in seizing, confining, detaining, or transporting Poike without authority of law or
the consent of her parents. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 764-101(l)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1). The marshaled evidence, however, was
"so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt'" that Reed's conduct constituted a substantial step toward child
kidnapping. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136 at HIO (citations omitted).
It is questionable whether Reed actually opened the car door and said "Get in," as
Poike claimed. At trial, Poike remembered very few details about the car; she could not
recall exactly what Reed said when he opened the door; her testimony about the direction
the car was facing was unlikely and was contradicted by Ferguson; her testimony that
Talbott opened the door for her and she stayed outside while Talbott called the police was
contradicted by Talbott; she described Reed's hair as a black Mohawk, even though his
hair was blond and greased back; and her testimony that the man told her to get into the
car only the second time he stopped was inconsistent with her previous statements. R.
226:24-28, 30, 33-34, 36, 39-42, 48-50, 53-55, 68, 76-77, 79; State's Exhibits 2, 3;

20

Defendant's Exhibit 4-b. Collectively, this evidence suggests Poike's memory may have
been tainted by the stress of the encounter, causing her to recall the encounter as worse
than it actually was. See State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-89 (Utah 1986) ("Contrary to
much accepted lore, when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress,
perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly."). Thus, Poike's testimony that
Reed opened the car door and told her to "Get in" is questionable, especially since it was
directly contradicted by Ferguson, who was not under the same stress as Poike and who
never saw Reed turn around or open the car door. R. 226:83-84.
Even assuming Reed opened the car door and said "Get in," however, it is not
reasonable to conclude this conduct strongly corroborated that Reed intentionally or
knowingly acted to commit child kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1 )-(2);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-301.1(1). Reed said during
his opening statement and during his testimony that his intent during the encounter was
not to kidnap Poike, but to get a thrill or a rush by startling her. R. 226:17, 119. The
marshaled evidence strongly corroborates this intent, rather than the mental state required
by the attempt statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101(l)-(2).
All of Reed's actions were counterproductive to kidnapping. He selected a
neighborhood full of people, at least one of whom was on a front porch watching, and at
least occasional cars. R. 226:23, 29-30, 41, 76-77; State's Exhibit 7. He was directly
across the street from Poike the first time he stopped, but, according to Poike's testimony,
he did not induce her to get into the car then. R. 226:24-25, 33,36. Instead, he tried only
to expose himself to her. Id. at 25-26, 35. Reed then made a U-turn, bringing himself
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right next to Poike, but he did not stop or induce her to get into the car then either. R.
226:26, 36, 77, 81-82. Instead, he drove right past Poike and kept driving until he
reached the stop sign at the end of the block, thereby putting six houses (three on either
side of the street) between him and his intended victim, and increasing the likelihood that
people in the intersection would witness or interrupt the supposed kidnapping. IcL at 2627, 36, 38, 77, 81-82; State's Exhibit 7.
More important, for Reed to have committed child kidnapping from his position at
the end of the block, as he was charged with attempting to do, he would have had to
induce Poike to abandon her plans and her "pretty big" dog; run half a city block past six
houses, at least one of which belonged to a friend of hers; and get into his vehicle without
crying out or otherwise drawing attention to herself. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44, 48, 77,
81-83; State's Exhibit 7. Such a feat would have required Reed, at the very least, to get
out of the car, display some kind of force or weapon, or otherwise threaten or chase
Poike. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1157 (holding evidence insufficient to establish
substantial step toward first degree murder where evidence showed defendant purchased
counterfeit crank but did not show she attempted to administer it to her husband). Any of
these actions may have represented a substantial step because they would have strongly
corroborated that Reed actually intended to commit or was acting with an awareness that
his conduct was reasonably certain to result in child kidnapping. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-4-101(l)-(2). But Reed did none of these things. R. 226:26-28, 39-40, 83-84.
Instead, according to Poike, Reed simply opened the car door and said "Get in."
Id. This did not constitute a substantial step because Reed knew his actions were not
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going to induce a 12-year-old girl to abandon her plans and her dog and run half a city
block past six neighbors' houses to get into a stranger's car. R. 226:26, 29-30, 36, 41, 44,
48, 77, 81-83; State's Exhibit 7. Rather, as asserted by Reed in his opening statement and
his testimony, the evidence suggests he was just trying to get a rush or a thrill. R. 226:17,
119. Poike did not give him the reaction he was seeking when he tried to expose himself
to her—she just ignored him and kept walking. Id Consequently, he tried again and this
time used an approach more likely to get the reaction he intended. Id. By opening the
car door and saying "Get in," he caused Poike to do exactly what he wanted her to do—
become frightened and run away, thereby giving him the thrill he was seeking. Id at 17,
28,77,83, 119.
Thus, this Court should reverse Reed's conviction for attempted child kidnapping
because there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. Instead, this Court
should enter a conviction for attempted lewdness involving a child, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-702.5 (2003) and Utah Code Ann. §
76-4-101.
If... an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to
support a conviction for an included offense... the verdict or
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense....
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(5) (2003). At trial in this case, Reed admitted he was guilty
of attempted lewdness involving a child, and the trial court submitted attempted lewdness
involving a child to the jury as a lesser-included offense. R. 179; 226:16.
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CONCLUSION
Reed respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for attempted child
kidnapping, and to enter a judgment of conviction for the lesser-included offense of
attempted lewdness involving a child.

SUBMITTED this 2S**day of November, 2005.

LORKf.SEP
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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witness.
MR. FISHER:

No further witnesses, Your Honor. At

this time the State would rest.
THE COURT:

The State has rested.

Ms. Remal, are you ready to proceed?
MS. REMAL:

I am.

I would like to make a matter of

record outside the presence of the jury, so I wonder if we
could excuse them.
THE COURT:

Let's take a five-minute recess, just

enough time to get you comfortable before we bring you back in.

(Jurors
THE COURT:

exit

Okay.

the

courtroom.)

Let the record reflect that the

jurors are not present in the courtroom.

The State has rested.

Ms. Remal?
MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, I would move the Court to

dismiss the case against Mr. Reed for insufficiency of evidence
or lack of establishing a prima facie case at this point. I
would, in support of that motion, would point to a couple of
different things:
Number one, it appears to me that there are a number
of inconsistencies in the various statements that Ashley Poike
has made about the incident that occurred on August 12th.
Number one is about the description of the defendant, and I
would ask the Court to refer to State's Exhibit 2 and 3 and
Defendant's Exhibit No. 4, which are photographs of Mr. Reed.

Det.

Coudy

Lougy

- Direct

by

Mr.

Fisher
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She described to Detective Schoney that the
individual who she interacted with that day had black hair and
a mohawk.

I would observe in those photographs he appears to

be mostly blond and not having a hairstyle that I would say is
a mohawk.
Secondly, there are different variations about what
she said about where it was that she crossed the street.

It's

my recollection that Ms. -- Ms. Talbott indicated that she told
her that she had gotten up to the corner, almost to the corner,
and came back.

She indicated to us today that she was closer

to the middle of the street as I recall.

And Mr. Ferguson

indicated he saw her cross right about the middle of that
block.
There are apparently a couple of different statements
about what statement the defendant or what things he said to
her when he was parked in that first location closer to
Mr. Ferguson's house.
and that was all.

She indicated today that he said, "Hey,"

According to Ms. Talbott, she indicated on

that date that she said something about getting into the car at
that time.

I would submit that those kinds of inconsistencies

do not support going forward with the case at this point.
Secondly, the charge, of course, is attempted child
kidnapping.

Attempt, of course, requires a substantial step be

taken by an individual, and I would submit to the Court that
even if taking the testimony of Ms. Poike in the light more
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favorable to the State, that that statement was made and the
car door was opened, that I do not believe that that's a
substantial step to the accomplishment of child kidnapping, so
for those reasons I would move to dismiss for insufficiency of
evidence.
THE COURT: With regards to your first point, yes,
there are inconsistencies, and but there are inconsistencies
usually in every case.

There's are inconsistencies with the

fact that she said he had dark hair.

I don't know why, but I

do have testimony to the effect that she identified -- she was
taken within a short amount of time to an individual stopped in
a car, and a car that she identified -- well, she -- of a
description that she had given, that she identified the
defendant as the individual --at least, I heard testimony from
officers that this is the defendant, or this is the individual
that she identified as the individual that committed these
alleged acts.

So I think the identification is good.

Yes, there is a discrepancy as to where she crossed
the road and the direction of where the car was pointing, but I
think those ares discrepancies that I think the jury is going
to have to deal with, so I deny your motion based on those
grounds.
Would you like to respond just so there's a record in
regards to the dismissal, because the argument is there isn't a
prima facie case in regards to the attempted kidnapping.
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MR. FISHER:
THE COURT:
MR. FISHER:

Well, I think Your Honor's -Well, I think substantial step towards.
Yes.

Your Honor has spelled out most

points I would make.
With regard to the issue of substantial step, I think
that the Court has to look at the overall circumstances, and
that would include that we're talking about a young girl, we
are talking about an attempt of a child kidnapping.
Whether throwing open a door and ordering an adult to
get in would be a substantial step might get to the level of
questioning that issue, but when you're talking about a
12-year-old frightened child, using a demanding tone after
having -- particularly after having instilled fear into that
child with the initial act or attempted act, I think that
anybody would say that that would be a -

there would be a

possibility that that child would respond to that command, be
afraid.

And taking the testimony at face value of throwing

open the door and issuing that kind of a command would be a
substantial step with a child.
THE COURT:

Thank you.

Ms. Remal, I agree with the State, and I deny your
motion.

There being a child involved in this, I think that if

I look at the testimony in the light most favorable to the
State for purpose of dismissal, I think they have established a
prima facie case.
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The evidence I have is that your client opened the
door and in a demanding voice ordered her to get in the car.
If she had gotten in the car, even for an instant, that
probably would have been a kidnapping.

I think he made a

substantial -- at least for the purpose of a prima facie case,
the opening of the door, and he demanding that she get in is a
substantial step towards the possibility of detaining her
against her will or without any authority, so I'm going to deny
your motion.

I think that they have established a prima facie

case.

All right.

Okay.

Are you ready to proceed?

MS. REMAL:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Do you want to bring -- are you ready

right away or do you need a break?
MS. REMAL:

No, we're ready.

THE COURT:

All right.

THE CLERK:

Mr. Langdon, did we enter No. 5?

THE COURT:

Yes, yes.

Let's bring the jury back.

That was the two vehicles, 4

and 5.
MR. FISHER:
THE COURT:
THE BAILIFF:

States 5 and 6 -- you're right, 4 and 5.
Yes, State's 4 and 5.
Third district court is back in

session, be seated.
THE COURT:

Back on the recordl in State of Utah vs.

David Carl Reed, 0914 ggg.

Let the record reflect the jurors

are back in the courtroom.

Defense counsel and defendant is
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ADDENDUM C

76-2-103.

Definitions,

A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware t h a t
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

76-4-101, Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this p a n , a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if he:
(a) engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the crime; and
(b) U) intends to commit the crime; or
(ii) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, he
acts with an awareness that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause
t h a t result.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct constitutes a substantial step if it
strongly corroborates the actor's mental state as defined in Subsection (1Kb).
(3) A defense to the offense of attempt does not arise:
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed if the attendant circumstances had been as the actor believed
them to be.

76-5-301.1. Child kidnapping.
(1) An actor commits child kidnapping if the actor intentionally or knowingly, without authority of law, and by any means and in any manner, seizes,
confines, detains, or transports a child under the age of 14 without the consent
of the victim's parent or guardian, or the consent of a person acting in loco
parentis.
(2) Violation of Section 76-5-303 is not a violation of this section.
(3) Child kidnapping is a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of not less than 6, 10, or 15 years and which may be for
life. Imprisonment is mandatory in accordance with Section 76-3-406.

